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Abstract 
This article analyses the regulatory handbooks produced by the new regulators for solicitors 
and barristers, the main legal professions in England and Wales, following the Legal Services 
Act 2007. It focuses on the new codes of conduct and the 10 high-level regulatory standards 
that are a feature of each handbook. The article examines the ways in which key interests 
have been dealt with in the handbooks from the perspective of the historical narratives of the 
legal professions and their publications, including their previous codes of conduct. It is found 
that the barristers’ and solicitors’ codes project different ethical orientations towards the 
supposedly universal ‘standard conception of the lawyer’s role’ based on the principles of 
neutrality and partisanship. The origins, meaning and significance of the high-level standards 
are considered. They are found not to reflect the content of the codes of conduct or to 
communicate cherished elements of the professions’ historical narratives. It is argued that this 
is problematic in terms of the professional functions of regulation, education and 
communication. 
Keywords: regulatory handbooks; codes of conduct; standard conception; regulatory 
standards, rule of law.   
The Legal Professions’ New Handbooks:  
Narratives, Standards and Values. 
 
Andrew Boon*  
I. Introduction 
 
Many different types of enterprise use codes of ethics for educational, aspirational or 
regulatory functions.
1
 For professions, they may also serve the purposes of claiming status
2
 or 
jurisdiction
3
 and providing a source of public evaluation.
4
 A professional code typically 
presents distinctive aspirations or ideals which define and distinguish the vocation.
5
 In liberal 
societies, lawyers’ identification with the value of justice is expressed as a formal 
commitment to the rule of law.
6
 By insistence on due process, known as formal legality or 
proceduralism, lawyers support the rule of law in two ways. First, they assert the individual 
liberty and personal autonomy of citizens, and others, and, second, in so doing, they assist the 
judiciary in controlling the executive in a constitutional separation of powers.
7
  These roles 
are linked in the ethics literature to a model; the standard conception of the lawyer’s role 
(‘standard conception’).8 This model produces a theory of lawyer’s ethics linking three 
principles:  providing representation irrespective of clients’ character or goals (principle of 
neutrality), using all legal means in representing them (principle of partisanship) and not then 
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being morally responsible for the consequences (principle of non-accountability). The 
standard conception is based on a reading of the American Bar Association Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct (ABA MR).
9
 Although these rules govern the single recognised 
profession operating in in the United States, the attorneys, criticism and defence of the ‘role-
differentiated behaviour’ the model is said to prescribe has dominated debate in the 
international legal ethics literature for forty years.
10
 The hegemony of the model reflects the 
high level of attention paid to lawyers’ ethics codes in the United States.11 The codes of 
lawyers in England and Wales have received less attention
12
 and none that considers in detail 
their formal engagement with the rule of law.  
 
This article aims to inform debates on the ethics of lawyers by clarifying the origins and 
contemporary significance of norms in a significant common law jurisdiction other than the 
United States. It is important to define the scope of inquiry. In England and Wales the term 
‘lawyer’ currently describes a wide range of legal occupations recognised by the Legal 
Services Act 2007: barristers, solicitors, notaries, legal executives, licensed conveyancers, 
trade mark attorneys, patent agents and law costs draughtsmen.
13
 Each type of lawyer has its 
own regulatory body and code of conduct. This article focuses on barristers and solicitors, 
both because they are the most important legal professions in the jurisdiction, and because of 
their historically complementary roles.
14
 The material considered includes material issued by 
the professions since they began issuing formal guidance. At the point when the Legal 
Services Act 2007 (LSA) was enacted, both used codes of conduct comprising fairly detailed, 
formally binding rules. Following the LSA, both regulators issued documents, called 
handbooks, containing a list of ten high-level professional standards (the standards), a code of 
conduct and assorted supplementary regulations. In conventional terminology the standards 
represent principles; a level of norms which set out how a profession seeks to realise its 
values.
15
 These norms were called principles only by the solicitors but the barristers called 
them core duties. In addition to the standards, both codes of conduct adopted a new format 
focusing on the outcomes that regulated parties were to achieve. In the codes of conduct 
themselves, solicitors abandoned rules while barristers retained rules, but in a role 
subordinate to outcomes. It is not proposed to consider these changes in format at length.  
 
This article is divided into six main sections tracing the evolution of norms into the current 
standards. The starting point, sections II and III, is the link between the formation of the 
liberal state under the rule of law, the adoption of key events in this process as professional 
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narrative
16
 and the transmission of relevant values into written standards and detailed norms. 
It will be shown that historically, and through normative selection and representation, 
barristers and solicitors formally engaged with the rule of law in different ways. Section IV 
develops this theme by examining the evolution of norms presented in the current codes of 
conduct in relation to the most relevant interest groups: consumer, client, public, third party 
and profession. The barristers’ and solicitors’ formal normative engagement with the rule of 
law is measured against an index representing the principles of neutrality and partisanship. 
Where relevant, provisions from the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct are compared. The approach aims to explain the development of the codes of 
conduct in a way that is sensitive to factors identified in the social science literature.
17
 The 
analysis will show that barristers share with attorneys a similar, though not identical, ethical 
orientation to the standard conception, while that of the solicitors, on the chosen measures, is 
markedly different. This raises the issue of whether the standard conception adequately 
explains the ethics of lawyers primarily concerned with transactions as opposed to litigation. 
Section V explores the origins of the high-level standards, the reasons for the selection of 
individual items and the priorities revealed by presentation, organisation and sequence. It is 
proposed that the values supported by the standards are counter-intuitive; solicitors claim 
promotion of the rule of law as a formal standard whereas barristers do not. The final section 
considers some implications of the analysis. It identifies potential problems in terms of the 
regulatory, aspirational and educational functions of professional norms.  
 
 
II. Professional Narratives: Engagements with Liberalism and the Rule of Law  
 
Hazard suggests that the professional rules of the legal profession in the United States, the 
attorneys, enforce three core values; loyalty, confidentiality and candour to the court’. 18 
These obligations derive, he says, from a narrative depicting ‘resistance to government 
intervention in the lives, liberty, or property of private parties’.19  Hazard suggests that this 
commitment, which manifests as defence of due process, is a common legacy of the Anglo-
American legal professions finding its rationale in a commitment to the rule of law. While 
this may be true, any legacy is in fact shared by barristers and solicitors in England and 
Wales. The parts most clearly identified with each profession derive from different histories, 
coinciding with different periods in the processes of political, legal and economic liberalism 
and hence with distinct elements of the rhetoric of the rule of law.
20
 Barristers’ history is tied 
to the establishment of rights and freedoms through trial advocacy and with liberalisation in 
the political and legal spheres. The solicitors’ narrative is aligned with economic 
liberalisation and the evolution of a capitalist economy. It is not surprising, therefore, that a 
strong alignment with the neutral partisanship of the standard conception is clear in the 
barristers’ historical narrative but less so in that of the solicitors. 
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Elements of the legal role later claimed by the Bar were present in medieval legal culture. 
The advocate’s duty to accept clients, a feature of the principle of neutrality, is glimpsed in 
judicial speeches to new serjeants at law
21
 admonishing them never to be ‘blind’, unable to 
‘give counsel to anyone who should seek it’,22 or the Scottish Court of Session rule that ‘[n]o 
advocate without very good cause shall refuse to act for any person tendering a reasonable 
fee, under pain of deprivation of his office of advocate’.23 The political upheavals if the 18th 
century provided the opportunity for the Bar to claim a role in establishing ‘the constitutional 
rights of freeborn Englishmen, and eventually of all men everywhere.
24
 Radical barristers, 
through collective action and individual cases, helped establish rights to due process, free 
speech, press and assembly.
25
 Confronting the state, and the prejudice of juries drawn from 
the propertied classes, the claim to a neutral partisan role as a professional obligation was 
strategic. The shared Anglo-American ethical legacy draws on utterances by barristers such 
as Thomas Erskine and Henry Brougham.
26
 Erskine, defending Thomas Paine against a 
charge of seditious libel arising from the publication of Part II of The Rights of Man, claimed 
neutral representation as a fundamental principle. Responding to the prosecution’s jibe that it 
was a disgrace for a barrister to represent Paine, Erskine claimed that, were barristers to deny 
representation, ‘… from that moment the liberties of England are at an end’.27 Brougham’s 
partisan defence of Queen Caroline against charges of adultery brought by George IV 
asserted that the primary duty of a lawyer was to save his client ‘by all means and expedients, 
and at all hazards and costs to other persons… though it should be his unhappy fate to 
involve his country in confusion’.28   
  
During the nineteenth century, the Bar’s narrative accommodated the formalisation of a duty 
to the court.
29
 In the twentieth century the advent of legal aid led to the mass processing of 
clients often found guilty.
30
 This led to a formalisation of due process rhetoric to 
accommodate judicial insistence that ‘the advocate, and the advocate alone, remains 
responsible for the forensic decisions and strategy’.31 This demand underpinned various 
practices, such as sentence discounting and charge bargaining, leading to the ‘mass 
production of guilty pleas’, and even the entering guilty pleas for innocent defendants.32 The 
duty not to mislead the court meant that barristers could allow a ‘not guilty’ plea only if they 
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had not heard a confession or, having heard a confession, if they did not lead inconsistent 
evidence, such as an alibi. The barrister’s role therefore demanded a kind of detachment from 
both client and bench. It facilitated the pragmatic disposition of even the hardest cases, such 
as those involving terrorism, ‘in the best interests of clients’33 while observing the duty to the 
court. The accommodation of the principles of neutrality and partisanship within a framework 
of due process is central to the ideology of the Bar.
 34
 It casts the barrister as a kind of priestly 
interlocutor between individual and state on behalf of the rule of law.  
 
In the 1990s the Law Society campaign for the right of solicitors to appear as advocates in 
senior courts played into a government agenda for disrupting professional monopolies.
35
 The 
Bar had assumed that its monopoly, and hence its independence, was a component in the 
constitutional independence of the judiciary
36
 and, for a while, the judiciary agreed. The 
underlying threat of fusion of the professions, mooted in the government’s Green Papers, 
caused the Lord Chief Justice to claim the proposals were ‘sinister’.37 High Court judges 
suggested they represented ‘a grave breach of the doctrine of separation of powers’ and 
required the concurrence of the judiciary.
38
 The issue of professional and judicial 
independence was said to be ‘more important now than ever because one of the great 
constitutional tasks of the courts today is to control misuse of powers by Government 
ministers and departments’.39 The Bar had little experience of mobilising public opinion, and 
its campaign was dismissed later as ‘apoplectic hyperbole’,40  but the government settled for 
promoting competition by whittling away the differences between barristers and solicitors.  
 
The Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (CLSA) introduced measures allowing solicitors to 
appear as advocates in senior courts. This changed the situation of the professions in relation 
to elite advocacy. By August 2015, 1,769 solicitors had a qualification allowing them to 
appear in the highest civil courts, 3,350 had the equivalent criminal qualification and 1,532 
were dual qualified.
41
 This total of 6,651 higher court solicitor advocates compared with only 
12,709 self-employed barristers who, in 2014, had acquired higher court rights on 
qualification.
42
 Until the 1980s, and despite rights of audience bestowed by the County 
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Courts Act 1846, the solicitors had displayed only mild and episodic interest in advocacy.
43
 
The success of its advocacy campaign emboldened the Law Society to consider a future 
without the Bar. When the judges argued that there should be one regulator for elite 
advocacy, the Law Society boldly claimed that it was better resourced for the role.
44
 
 
The solicitors’ enthusiasm for advocacy was relatively fresh. Until the 1980s, their history 
was quite different from that of barristers, partly as a result of a later professionalization 
trajectory. Although a society was formed in 1739 to raise the status of different types of 
lawyers who were not barristers, the solicitors, as they became known collectively, only 
began to be influential following the creation of the Law Society in 1825.
45
 The solicitors’ 
and barristers’ professions accepted a settlement of work jurisdictions which allowed 
barristers to consolidate their exclusive right of access to higher courts, leaving solicitors with 
a legal monopoly of land transfers. As the profession dealing with clients direct, solicitors 
gained a de facto monopoly of business transactions for the industrialist, financial and 
merchant classes. Their historic role therefore, lay in accommodating capitalism within the 
framework of the rule of law.
46
 Their key principle was arguably confidentiality. Although 
solicitors and barristers offered clients advice protected by legal professional privilege (LPP), 
this was arguably less significant for barristers, who held no client records.
47
  
 
As a profession of business, a priority for solicitors was a collective reputation for probity. 
The task of securing this reputation was made more difficult by the size, diversity and 
geographical spread of solicitors. For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
repeated defaults necessitated measures to reassure the public that money was safe in 
solicitors’ hands. Between 1900 and 1905, for example, 220 solicitors were declared 
bankrupt
48
 leading to proposals, in 1907, that they be required to establish separate accounts 
for holding client and office money.
49
 Keen to preserve its porous jurisdiction, the Law 
Society was discreetly useful to government and became ringed by enabling and protective 
legislation.
50
 In the 1930s, these statutory provisions began to define the professional 
narrative. Detailed accounts rules were established, requirements for compulsory indemnity 
insurance introduced, and a Compensation Fund for victims of dishonesty was established.
51
 
These measures were so successful that, by the end of the century, Lord Bingham could 
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express an apparently genuine expectation of  ‘the solicitors' profession as one in which every 
member, of whatever standing, may be trusted to the ends of the earth’.52 One of the 
significant steps in this process was the introduction of the Solicitors Practice Rules, which 
are considered in the next section. 
 
In summary, the legal professions actively participated in the development of the liberal state 
under the rule of law, but their different roles and professional trajectories allotted them 
different parts in that process. The Bar’s key role lay in relation to political and legal 
liberalism. Its narrative reflected a commitment to adversarial process and equated the 
barristers’ role in promoting the rule of law with due process, or legalism.53 As transaction 
lawyers, the solicitors’ role lay in promoting economic liberalism. An essential element in 
this process was establishing client trust; by limiting opportunities for solicitor and own client 
conflicts of interest and ensuring client compensation for default. The key value was arguably  
client confidentiality, which, together with LPP, would come to be regarded as a cornerstone 
of the rule of law.
54
 Therefore, of the core values identified by Hazard, the barristers are tied 
closely to loyalty and candour to the court while confidentiality is more fundamental to 
solicitors.  
 
III. Development of the Codes 
 
A. A brief history of the conduct rules  
The first Bar Code of Conduct 1981 (BCC 1981), created on the recommendation of the 
Benson Commission,
55
 was based on a noted book on advocacy and Bar culture.
56
 The ethical 
core was sandwiched by regulatory material. This grew, through eight editions, with the 
addition of material designed to defend the status of barristers as self-employed 
practitioners.
57
 The Bar Code of Conduct 2014 recognised changes in the barristers’ core 
markets occurring since 1990. It was drafted so as to allow barristers to apply for practising 
certificate extensions enabling them to conduct litigation. Rules preventing self-employed 
barristers from sharing premises and forming associations with non-barristers were removed. 
Provisions in the previous code, prohibiting barristers from handling client money, paying 
referral fees and managing client affairs, were retained, but a way of holding money that did 
not contravene these rules was introduced.
58
 The Bar was clinging as far as possible to its 
traditional role and identity while bowing to the necessity of competition with solicitors for 
core legal work. 
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The solicitors’ first set of conduct rules, the Solicitors Practice Rules 1936 (SPR 1936), were 
created under the Solicitors Act 1932.
59
 They were disappointing as a clarion call, comprising 
only a brief series of bans on touting, charging less than scale fees, sharing fees and entering 
agreements for referrals by claims farmers. The rules therefore reflected a preoccupation with 
protecting professional boundaries from the risks of solicitation for clients, dilution of lawyer 
control of practice and pollution by contact with non-legal work. This began a long running 
fight to protect the solicitor brand from the taint of inappropriate association and temptations 
for corruption. Additions to the SPR 1936, made in 1967, 1971 and 1975, introduced relatively 
minor requirements governing name plates, inviting instructions and supervision of offices.  
 
After years of relative inactivity three sets of practice rules were produced between 1987 and 
1990. The last of these was a reaction to threatened legislation on restrictive trade practices,
60
 
which never materialised. The substantive rules dealt with demarcation of professional 
boundaries (employed solicitors, not acting as a structural surveyor or valuer), proscriptions 
(fee sharing, receiving contingency fees, acting for borrower and lender on a private mortgage) 
and standards (supervision of offices, client care). The SPR 1990 were later supplemented by 
rules on confidentiality, conflicts of interest and advocacy. This last addition, first proposed 
only in 1990,
61
 anticipated the CLSA 1990 and the end of the Bar’s monopoly of higher court 
advocacy. The rule itself simply stated ‘[a]ny solicitors acting as an advocate shall at all times 
comply with the Law Society’s Code for Advocacy’.62 The Code for Advocacy was based on 
the Bar’s core advocacy provisions, as set out in BCC 1981. 
 
The practice rules were apparently not seen as having educative value. Before 1960 guides to 
solicitors’ conduct took the form of amended versions of the Solicitors Acts.63 This changed 
in 1960 when the Law Society published A Guide to the Professional Conduct and Etiquette 
of Solicitors.
64
 Written by Sir Thomas Lund, the secretary of the Law Society, it went through 
various changes of title before emerging as The Guide to the Professional Conduct of 
Solicitors (The Guide) in 1990. Three editions were published under that name, the eighth 
and final edition appearing in 1999. Gaps and deficiencies in the practice rules were filled by 
The Guide with other ‘rules’, guidance and stand-alone codes, some made under statutory 
authority and others not. The rules were added as ‘the Council’s interpretation of the basic 
principles summarised in Practice Rule 1 [as presented in SPR 1990] as applied to the various 
circumstances arising in the course of a solicitor’s practice’.65 In 1999 the Law Society 
established a Regulation Review Working Party, the main task of which was to produce a 
comprehensive and enforceable code of conduct. This resulted in The Solicitors Code of 
Conduct 2007 (SCC 2007).  
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The opportunity to articulate a vision of the solicitors’ profession entering the new 
millennium was not fully seized in the SCC 2007. The lack of ambition was signalled by the 
chairman of the group emphasising the need for the rule book to be comprehensible to 
clients.
66
 An academic member of the working party, Jenny Levin, suggested that the group 
perceived its remit as: 
 
‘… ‘to provide a fair system of regulation which clearly defines the duties of solicitors 
and the standards of service and conduct which clients can expect, with the aim of 
inspiring both public confidence and client satisfaction in the profession’.  It is 
deliberately low key. It is client-centred but also realistic and deliverable…67  
 
The resulting code was, in fact, a major edit of The Guide; undoubtedly an advance in terms 
of presentation and accessibility.  Deriving from the core duties there were 25 sections of 
detailed and binding practice rules and non-binding guidance. There was, however, little 
material not previously in The Guide, except that driven by new case law.
68
 A chapter on 
litigation and advocacy was largely based on the Law Society’s Code for Advocacy.  The 
SCC 2007 replaced the SPR 1990, and The Guide from 1 July 2007, but, was itself replaced 
following the LSA.  
 
B. Creation of the new handbooks 
The LSA required a new government agency, the Legal Services Board (LSB) to ensure that 
approved regulators acted compatibly with and promoted the regulatory objectives.
69
 The 
separation of professions’ representative and regulatory function in the way required by the 
Act would, Abel claimed, ‘explicitly acknowledge the end of professionalism’70 but the 
regulatory objectives of the LSA attempted to strike a balance between professional and 
consumerist agendas. Objectives such as improving access to justice, protecting, promoting 
the interests of consumers and promoting competition in the provision of services in the legal 
sector were balanced against others, supporting the constitutional principle of the rule of law, 
encouraging an independent, strong, diverse and effective legal profession and promoting and 
maintaining adherence to the professional principles.
71
 If the Act’s regulatory objectives were 
largely novel, the professional principles were firmly grounded in the professions’ codes of 
conduct. They stipulated that persons authorised to practice should act with independence and 
integrity, maintain proper standards of work, act in the best interests of their clients, keep the 
affairs of clients confidential and, when exercising rights of audience, or conducting 
litigation, comply with their duty to the court to act with independence in the interests of 
justice.
72
  
 
The new, independent regulators, for barristers the Bar Standards Board (BSB) and for 
solicitors the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA), both committed to producing new codes 
of conduct. The SRA decided quickly to apply to also regulate Alternative Business 
                                                 
66
 E Nally ‘Simplifying the Rules’ (2001) 4:1 Legal Ethics 8.  
67
 J Levin ‘Work in Progress- The Law Society Regulation Review Working Party’ (2000) 3:2 
Legal Ethics 122. 
68
 Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (a firm) [1999] 2 A.C. 222 (see further A Boon The Ethics and 
Conduct of  Lawyers in England and Wales (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2014) 358-362) . 
69
 LSA 2007 s. 3(2) and s. 28(2). 
70
 Abel (n 40), 146.  
71
 LSA2007 s.1(1) 
72
 Ibid s. 1.3(a) to (e). 
Structures; entities recognised by the LSA for delivering legal services that could be owned 
or managed by non-lawyers.
73
 The BSB was less sure about this step but eventually decided 
to regulate organisations owned and managed by barristers, and other lawyers, that wished to 
specialise in providing advocacy and litigation services and specialist legal advice. It then 
decided that it would also apply to be a regulator of entities, a step yet to be fully realised.
74
 
The LSB advocated Principles-Based Regulation,
75
 and required applicants to regulate ABS 
to adopt it. The SRA resolved to use the same code of conduct in regulating both 
organisations and individuals
76
 and the Bar eventually followed suit.
77
 Thus, both professions 
were required to produce principles, high-level standards, as part of their rule books and to 
ensure that conduct norms were expressed as outcomes rather than rules. In 2011 the SRA 
Handbook was published containing the SRA Principles and the SRA Code of Conduct 2011 
(SRA CC 2011). The BSB published the BSB Handbook in 2014 including the BSB Core 
Duties and the Bar Standards Board Code of Conduct 2014 (BSB CC 2014). 
 
In presenting its plans the SRA made great play of abandoning rules in favour of a tripartite 
structure of obligations comprising Principles, Outcomes and Indicative Behaviours.
78
 
Principles were mandatory and framed at a high level of abstraction. The SRA stated that the 
principles represented ‘the fundamental ethical and professional standards that we expect of 
all firms … and individuals when providing legal services’.79 Outcomes were also mandatory 
but less broad, while indicative behaviours were favoured options for achieving outcomes.  
The SRA CC 2011 had twelve substantive chapters organised in four sections; ‘You and 
Your Client’, ‘You and Your Business’, ‘You and Your Regulator’ and ‘You and Others’. 
This order was apparently purposive and most likely a hierarchy. It largely repeated the 
sequence of SCC 2007, except for granting the regulator its own chapter and inserting it 
before ‘others’. The BSB CC 2014 used a structure somewhere between the SRA template 
and a conventional code of conduct. This was based on core duties, outcomes, rules and 
guidance. The BSB noted that the content of the code was familiar but ‘the layout is 
markedly different’.80 One of the main differences was arrangement. The odd structure of the 
BCC 1981 was replaced in BSB CC 2014, with practice rules and administrative 
requirements separated into discrete parts.
81
 The order of substantive chapters was 
unconventional. It ran ‘You and the Court’, ‘Behaving Ethically’, ‘You and Your Client’, 
‘You and Your Regulator’ and ‘You and Your Practice’. The decision not to make clients the 
subject of the primary chapter is intriguing; it may be seen as  reinforcement of the message 
that barristers’ primary role was expert management of inherent tensions in the rule of law.  
 
 
IV. The Obligations in the New Codes 
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The ethical orientation of the codes of conduct can be assessed by focusing on how key 
interests are protected. It has been suggested that at least nine groups are owed duties under 
the new codes.
82
 The analysis conducted here focuses on five key interests; consumers of 
legal services, clients, the public interest, individual third parties and the profession. This is 
because the main job of the codes is to manage potential conflicts between the duties owed to 
these groups.  These duties are analysed in relation to the substantive constituent principles of 
the standard conception, neutrality and partisanship. There are different ways of constructing 
these principles but, for the purpose of this analysis, they are sub-divided into two indexes as 
set out in Table 1. Neutrality comprises, first, commitments to accept consumers as clients 
(‘N1’) and, second, to accept client objectives, including those with a moral component 
(‘N2’). Partisanship involves, first, obligations to use all lawful means to achieve client 
objectives (P1) and, second, the absence of third party or public interest constraints on actions 
for clients (P2).  
 
 
Table 1: Framework for analysing codes commitments to the ‘standard conception’ 
  
 
Neutrality 
N1: Duty to accept consumers as clients 
 
N2: Duty to accept client objectives, 
including those with a moral component 
 
Partisanship 
P1: Duty to use all lawful means to achieve 
client objectives 
 
P2: Limited constraints on actions for clients 
 
 
     A. Consumers 
Although the LSA defines consumers broadly to include clients and some third parties, this does 
not do justice to a distinction often drawn in lawyers’ codes of conduct. This recognises a 
difference between individuals not yet accepted as clients, but owed responsibilities as seekers 
of legal services, and clients. For the purpose of the present analysis, it is only the former group, 
seekers of services, that is referred to as consumers. They are potential beneficiaries of 
distinctive rules covering matters such as acceptance as a client, advertising and rules on 
conflicts of interest.  
 
Because the BSB CC 2014 and the SRA CC 2011 adopt the wide definition of consumer in the 
LSA, they are only mentioned briefly in the introductions to the codes. Provisions protecting 
seekers of legal services are, however, far from absent. The BCC 1981 rule headed ‘Acceptance 
of instructions and the ‘Cab-rank rule’’ is a strong example of an N1 obligation because it 
prevents barristers withholding advocacy services on the ground that the ‘nature of the case..’ or 
‘…the conduct opinions or beliefs of the prospective client’ are unacceptable to him or to any 
section of the public.
83
 A rule with similar content was retained in BSB CC 2014
84
 and it was 
strengthened by removal of an exception to the rule. The power to refuse briefs when no proper 
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fee was offered
85
 became controversial when the Bar Council ‘deemed’ graduated fees, for 
family and criminal legal aid work, not proper professional fee for the purpose of the exception. 
This meant that barristers were not obliged to accept that work. Although a rule on adequate fees 
was retained in BSB CC 2014,
86
 the BSB decided that deeming a fee inadequate was a decision 
that a representative body, rather than a regulatory body, would make. The BSB thought that it 
could neither make that move itself nor delegate it to the Bar Council. It therefore left individual 
barristers to decide whether a legal aid fee was inappropriate and to ‘defend that decision if 
challenged’.87 In the new rules, the cab rank requirement only applied to situations where 
instructions were received from professional clients, such as solicitors. Therefore, it could apply 
in litigation, where a barrister is instructed to attend a police station, for example, when the 
barrister normally did that kind of work.
88
 It is assumed that the cab rank principle was not 
applied where a consumer approached a barrister entity direct because the screening service 
previously provided by solicitors had been removed. Nevertheless, the cab rank rule for 
advocacy places barristers high on the N1 index, even compared with the ABA MR. The rules 
for attorneys contain no similar duty to represent, but merely note that representation ‘does not 
constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or 
activities’.89 
 
The solicitors’ perspective on obligations to consumers purported to protect their freedom of 
choice. Rules against touting in SPR 1936 were gradually broadened in subsequent versions, 
until the SPR 1990 contained several rules that were arguably concerned with protecting 
consumer rather than client interests.
90
 These rules were the product of concerted campaigns to 
prevent solicitors from being tied to specific arrangements for obtaining instructions. Apart from 
this, the general position in The Guide, and subsequently the SCC 2007, was that solicitors could 
decide whether or not to accept instructions.
91
 This right to refuse consumers, except where to 
do so would be discriminatory in law, was maintained in SRA CC 2011.
92
  
 
In the period following the CLSA 1990, the solicitors’ position on accepting consumers as 
clients was different in relation to advocacy. The Law Society was initially concerned that a 
House of Lords amendment to the Act would impose a cab rank rule on solicitors
93
 but, in the 
event, there was no such requirement. The Law Society Code for Advocacy therefore copied 
only part of the rule in BCC 1981. As with the Bar’s rule this prohibited refusing instructions on 
the grounds that ‘the conduct, opinions or beliefs of the client are unacceptable to the advocate 
or to any section of the public’.94 This rule was carried into the SCC 2007.95 At this point there 
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was a negligible difference between the professions in relation to advocacy consumers; barristers 
were committed to accepting briefs while solicitors were not permitted to refuse them on moral 
grounds. The SRA Code 2011, however, expunged the obligation, leaving solicitors free to 
refuse advocacy consumers on moral grounds, provided no unlawful discrimination was 
involved. Therefore, while the barristers’ rules placed them high on the N1 index, solicitors were 
no more committed to accepting consumers, even for advocacy, than any non-legal business,.      
 
    B. Clients 
Lawyer neutrality in relation to client objectives is one the most controversial aspects of the 
standard conception. ABA MR 2007 provided that ‘[a] lawyer shall not intentionally fail to seek 
the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means permitted by law and the 
Disciplinary Rules’.96 This seems to require lawyers to set aside moral considerations presenting 
or arising during representation. This position can be reconciled with the rule of law obligations 
of lawyers when the objectives consist of lawful entitlements.
97
 The duty to pursue objectives is 
quite different from the corresponding duty on members of both professions in England and 
Wales. The obligation to pursue a client’s best interests is more ambiguous because it does not 
appear to require the lawyer to accept the client’s moral position. It is therefore necessary to 
consider the history of the obligation to understand what it involves. The BCC 1981 first 
referred to the obligation when requiring that a practising barrister ‘promote and protect 
fearlessly and by all proper and lawful means his lay client's best interests…’.98 This appears to 
make sense in the particular context of criminal defence because, as discussed above, the 
barrister was held to be responsible for the conduct of the case and had to keep the duty to the 
court and the client’s ‘best interests’ in view. It is less clear why the solicitors also adopted a 
duty ‘to act in the client’s best interests’ in the SPR 1987 as part of Practice Rule 1. It was not 
due to Lund, whose advice on the professional relationship consisted of a warning that conflicts 
of interest could lead to ‘embarrassment’.99  
 
Neutrality in relation to client objectives clearly supports a central goal of the liberal state; 
promoting client autonomy and moral agency.
100
 Promotion of neutrality in relation to client 
objectives is a plausible goal of the consumerist agenda promoted by the LSA. It did not, 
however, lead to changes in the SRA CC, which retained the historic focus on clients’ ‘best 
interests’ and, therefore, potentially continued to obscure the issue of whether the solicitor or 
client was in charge of decision-making. Even as the client came more clearly into view in later 
editions of The Guide, the solicitor’s obligation was described as doing ‘his best for his client in 
the way that he thinks best for the client’.101 When the ‘best interests’ formula was introduced in 
the SPR 1987, a guidance note provided that a ‘solicitor must not allow a client to override his 
professional judgement’.102 This kind of advice later disappeared, but retention of the ‘best 
interests’ formula arguably marked a transition from explicit to implicit paternalism. This was at 
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odds with other parts of The Guide which, from the 1990s, made tentative steps towards 
recognising client autonomy as an issue. This was illustrated by the example of solicitors’ sexual 
relations with clients. Lund refers to a disciplinary case where a solicitor used his position ‘to 
cloak and further an adulterous association’, but held that ‘to be a co-respondent in a divorce suit 
is not in itself professional misconduct’.103 In later editions of The Guide, solicitors were warned 
of a potential breach of the fiduciary relationship when entering sexual relationships with 
clients.
104
  The guidance was watered down in SCC 2007
105
 and omitted from the SRA CC 
2011, partly as a result of trimming the code, but also because of a change of emphasis in 
material relating to clients. This began with the SPR 1990, and the introduction of a rule on 
client care
106
 intended to reduce complaints. It increased the information that solicitors were 
required to give to clients, including details of internal complaints procedures. With the passage 
of time, client care came to dominate the normative framework of the code describing solicitor 
and client relationships.  
 
The SCC 2007 recognised the issue of client autonomy more explicitly with the introduction of 
a requirement to ‘identify the client’s objectives’ and ‘agree next steps’.107 The SRA CC 2011 
apparently took a backward step with the Outcome that ‘clients are in a position to make 
informed decisions about the services they need, how their matter will be handled and the 
options available to them’.108 This removed the need to agree next steps. It also continued to 
obfuscate the issue of whether solicitors must pursue clients’ preferred options. Thus, in SRA 
CC 2011, despite there being several Indicative Behaviours dealing with taking instructions,
109
 
none mention the possibility of solicitors obtaining consent to act against client’s best interests, 
but in accordance with their wishes. Therefore, despite the consumerist aspirations of the LSA, 
the solicitors have arguably gone backwards in promoting client autonomy since its passage. It 
probably did not assist promotion of a progressive agenda on this score that the Act adopted 
acting in clients’ best interests as a professional principle.   
 
The second part of the Bar duty to clients, to use proper and lawful means on their behalf, 
matches the high position of the ABA model rule on the P1 index. The partisan obligation is 
limited only by legal, court and conduct rules and implies that clients may judge the morality of 
actions taken on their behalf. The solicitors did not express a partisan obligation in relation to 
general work, but briefly adopted the Bar standard for advocacy clients. One of the provisions in 
The Law Society Code for Advocacy 1993 replicated the barristers’ duty to ‘promote and protect 
fearlessly and by all proper and lawful means the lay client's best interests’.110 When the 
advocacy code was absorbed into the SCC 2007, the chapter on litigation and advocacy did not 
refer to the duty to clients at all, suggesting that the general duty now applied by default. This 
impression was reinforced by guidance referring to ‘… your duty to act in your client’s best 
interests’.111 The solicitors therefore lost the phrase ‘by all proper and lawful means’ from their 
rule. Although guidance incidentally referred to ‘… robustly defending your client’s 
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position’,112 the change effected a reduced commitment to P1. The result was that, in relation to 
clients, the barristers’ code fell some way short of the ABA standard on N2, but matched it on 
P1. The solicitors’ rules fell short of the ABA standard on N2, but matched the Bar on that 
indicator. The solicitors, however, fell short of both the other codes in relation to P2, even in 
relation to advocacy.  
      
    C. The public interest  
One of the criticisms of the standard conception is that it appears to justify lawyers’ actions on 
behalf of clients contrary to the public interest.
113
 Duties to act in the public interest, for 
example, reporting clients undertaking legal but environmentally risky activity, would reduce a 
legal profession’s commitment to the standard conception, particularly in relation to N2 and P1. 
Such duties were largely absent in the codes. The exception was the duty to the court, expressed 
in the BCC 1981 as a duty not to ‘knowingly or recklessly mislead’ the court;114 a clear public 
interest provision directed to achieving justice. The duty was, however, limited because it only 
required barristers to persuade clients to correct evidential errors. The only sanction if they 
refused was that the advocate withdrew from representation. Clients retained the right to 
confidentiality over the issue, a consequence that pushes legal professionals in general up the N2 
and P2 indexes.  
 
The Bar’s codes of conduct consistently reflected barristers’ personal responsibility for the 
presentation of cases. This restricted the autonomy of litigants with the result that such 
provisions registered negatively on the N2 index. BCC 1981 required barristers to refuse 
instructions seeking to limit their ordinary authority or discretion in the conduct of proceedings 
in Court.
115
 The Law Society Code for Advocacy 1993 version of this rule stated that solicitor 
advocates were ‘personally responsible for the conduct and presentation of their case’116 but 
neither the SCC 2007 nor SRA CC 2011 had a similar provision. The solicitors’ rules therefore 
gave greater scope for clients of solicitor advocates to determine case strategy than clients 
instructing barristers. This raised solicitors, possibly unintentionally, on the N2 index relative to 
the Bar. 
 
Apart from the duty to the court there are few public facing duties in either code. This is 
probably because such duties would cut across client rights to confidentiality and LPP. An 
example in BCC 1981 required withdrawal, but not reporting, where a client had improperly 
obtained legal aid.
117
 Such public-facing norms as did exist tended to appear as exceptions to 
general rules supporting confidentiality, rather than in sections dedicated to the public 
interest. This approach is evident in the 7
th
 edition of The Guide which noted statutory 
obligations to report suspicions of money-laundering or terrorist activity, but did so in 
chapters on organising practices.
118
 A more significant public interest ethical provision was a 
rule in The Guide stating that confidentiality could ‘be overridden in exceptional 
circumstances’.119 No test for exceptional circumstances was provided, but guidance notes 
suggested that solicitors who thought they were ‘… being used by a client to facilitate the 
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commission of a crime or fraud’, should ‘assess the situation in the light of their professional 
judgment’.120  No rule on overriding confidentiality was included in SCC 2007 and overall, 
there was a retreat from recognising exceptions. The lead note in extensive guidance on 
confidentiality stated that solicitors ‘should only provide such information as you are strictly 
required by law to disclose’ when approached by public authorities.121  
 
The BSB CC 2014 contained warnings against actions prejudicial to the administration of 
justice,
122
 but no indication that such duties extended beyond those already recognised in 
litigation and advocacy. None of the numerous reporting obligations in the new codes related 
to the client population.
123
 Even the duty to report serious misconduct among solicitors was 
expressly subject to client confidentiality.
124
 Previous hints that confidentiality could be 
breached in exceptional circumstances had been excised, with the result that public interest 
duties receded slightly in the SRA CC 2011. In contrast to the position of the domestic 
professions, the ABA MR made express provision for protection of the public interest. Model 
rule 1.6 permitted breach of client confidentiality to prevent ‘reasonably certain death or 
substantial bodily harm’125 or specific physical harms to another. Comment on the rule 
suggested that a lawyer may report a client who accidentally discharged toxic waste into a 
town's water supply to the authorities if there was a ‘present and substantial risk’ that persons 
would ‘contract a life-threatening or debilitating disease and the lawyer's disclosure was 
necessary to eliminate the threat or reduce the number of victims’.126 It also permitted 
disclosure ‘to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or 
property of another’ where this was likely to result or had resulted from the client's 
commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client had used the lawyer's 
services.
127
 Although the rule was permissive rather than mandatory, it may have encouraged 
compliance by increasing the risk of common law liability. The absence of similar specific 
obligations to the public interest in the domestic codes placed solicitors and barristers higher 
on the P2 index than attorneys. 
 
    D. Third parties 
ABA Model Rule 1.6, considered in the previous section, potentially operated for the benefit of 
individual third parties, particularly identifiable individuals threatened with death or bodily harm 
by clients. Neither the solicitors’ nor barristers’ codes currently contain any similar provision. 
The BCC 1981 had limited focus on the interests of individual third parties. Specific examples 
were limited to not alleging fraud without credible evidence,
128
 and limitations on cross-
examining witnesses, such as not asking questions ‘which are merely scandalous or intended or 
calculated only to vilify insult or annoy’.129 Despite containing a chapter entitled ‘Behaving 
Ethically’, the BSB 2014 contained little innovation, but was dominated by an outcome, and 
rule, concerned with behaving with ‘honesty, integrity and independence’.130 Six of the eight 
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sub-rules in the chapter were familiar examples from the old code. The rules were not adapted, 
for example, to address recent controversies regarding the hostile treatment of vulnerable 
witnesses under cross-examination by barristers.
131
  
 
The Solicitors Practice Rules imposed no specific third party duties. The Guide introduced a 
potentially onerous duty of frankness and good faith towards other solicitors,
132
 but the SCC 
2007 only adopted one rule, also previously in The Guide, not to ‘use your position to take 
unfair advantage of anyone either for your own benefit or for another person’s benefit’.133 
Subordinate rules provided examples which were limited in scope; agreeing costs, dealing with 
unqualified persons and not making unjustifiable claims in letters before action.
134
 The Guide 
also provided the most substantial provision relating to third parties in general, again in the 
guidance on confidentiality.
135
 Advice to the effect that confidence could be broken where it was 
necessary to prevent a client causing serious bodily harm
136
 was similar to the provision in the 
ABA MR. It is traceable to advice in Lund’s book that solicitors could inform police of a client’s 
intent to murder.
137
 The Guide did not go that far, but advised that a solicitor ‘may reveal 
confidential information to the extent that he or she believes necessary’.138 The SCC 2007 
retained this guidance,
139
 but it was not translated into SRA CC 2011. The current code retained 
the obligation not to take unfair advantage,
140
  but the indicative behaviours did not stipulate 
reporting obligations or permissions. The latest rules for both solicitors and barristers therefore 
contained limited duties to third parties compared with those applying to attorneys. This lack of 
constraint in pursing client interests arguably strengthened barristers’ and solicitors’ 
identification with the standard conception and hence raised their position on the P2 index. This 
is, however, a freedom rather than an obligation.  
 
     E. The profession 
Obligations owed to the profession could be invoked as constraints on neutral partisanship, 
but such provisions in the code tend to be either anodyne or imprecise. An example of the 
first kind of provision was a chapter in The Guide on relations with the Bar and other lawyers 
containing little more than exhortations to pay professional fees on time.
141
 An example of 
the second type is the rule in the BCC 2014 demanding honesty, integrity and independence. 
While this potentially constrained the conduct permitted under P1, it provided no assistance 
in defining the line between acceptable and unacceptable conduct. Rather, recent codes 
tended to focus on cooperation with regulators, including obligations to report fellow 
professionals, rather than substantive obligations. A duty on solicitors to report ‘serious 
misconduct’ was originally included as a single rule in The Guide,142 but the SCC 2007 
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developed this as part of ‘a systematic and effective approach to management’.143 Duties 
owed to regulators were expanded to four rules, covering co-operation, reporting, not 
obstructing complaints and production of documents.
144
  
 
The SRA CC 2011 chapter ‘You and Your Regulator’ included 13 outcomes and 12 
indicative behaviours. They included measures requiring principals to report members of 
their own firms.
145
 Barristers responded to the BSB consultation on its proposed new code by 
arguing that similar provisions would encourage abuse, such as reporting opponents as a 
litigation tactic, but responses from consumer organisations, arguing that it was unreasonable 
to expect consumers to police the profession, prevailed.
146
 A chapter in the BSB CC 2014 
therefore contained a relatively light three outcomes, and a reporting requirement,
147
 but 
considerable guidance on expectations of barristers’ relationship with the BSB.148 While 
these kinds of provision may help protect collective professional reputation by encouraging a 
culture of surveillance, they do not alter substantive obligations. While, therefore, onerous 
duties towards the profession may constrain partisan conduct on behalf of clients, the 
extension of reporting duties set out in the current codes is relatively neutral in terms of the 
indicators in Table 1. 
 
 F. An overview of the codes and introduction to the standards  
Detailed analysis of the key provisions of the new codes of conduct confirm the usefulness of 
the standard conception as a measure, but call into question the assumption that it is a 
uniform standard.
149
 Both domestic legal professions are at different points on four indexes 
for neutrality and partisanship when compared with each other and with attorneys in the US.  
The cab rank rule places barristers higher than attorneys and solicitors on N1 in relation to 
advocacy clients. The attorneys’ obligation to pursue client objectives suggests that they are 
higher on the N2 index, whereas the domestic professions’ obligation to pursue clients’ best 
interests gives them a low placing on that index.  Attorneys and barristers are high on the first 
limb of P1 because they promise clients that they will act up to the limits of the law, while 
solicitors make no such promise. Attorneys have more explicit permissions to protect third 
party interests than either barristers or solicitors. The failure of the domestic professions to 
match the ABA Model Code in protecting third party interests increases their markers on the 
P2 index. While it would decrease markers for neutrality and partisanship, providing 
reporting permissions would increase the distinctions between legal professionals and 
business practice. These conclusions suggest some alignment of attorneys’ and barristers’ 
codes around role-differentiated norms consistent with the standard conception. The solicitors 
currently occupy low markers on these indexes, suggesting that their norms may be closer to 
business norms than those of barristers and attorneys. This may be because the standard 
conception does not adequately capture the ethical orientation of transaction lawyers.  
 
The next section explores the origins and interpretation of the high level standards and 
compares those produced for solicitors and for barristers. As independent regulatory 
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standards, these lists are an integral part of the regulatory framework established by the 
handbooks. It is therefore necessary to consider the relationship between the standards and 
other normative sources, such as codes of conduct and professional narratives. In preceding 
sections it was suggested that these present quite different orientations to the rule of law and 
to the standard conception. It might therefore be expected that there would be significant 
differences in the high-level standards of solicitors and barristers. In fact, as will be seen, they 
are virtually identical, but such differences as do exist are contradictory and counter-intuitive. 
This conclusion forms the basis for Section VI, which considers the significance of the 
handbooks in general and in the light of these inconsistencies. 
 
V. Core Principles and Duties 
 
The SRA CC 2011 was not the first time that the solicitors’ rule book had used principles; the 
Law Society originally selected five for the SPR 1987. Practice Rule 1 stated that ‘a solicitor 
shall not directly or indirectly obtain instructions for professional work or permit another 
person to do so on his behalf, or do anything in the course of practising as a solicitor, in any 
manner which compromises or impairs or is likely to compromise or impair any of the 
following: 
 
(a) the solicitor's independence or integrity; 
(b) a person's freedom to instruct a solicitor of his or her choice; 
(c) the solicitor's duty to act in the best interests of the client; 
(d) the good repute of the solicitor or of the solicitor’s profession; 
(e) the solicitor's proper standard of work.’ 
 
In assessing the significance and meaning of individual items in such a list it is necessary to 
consider the context of creation. Both the prelude to the principles and principle (b) continued 
a preoccupation of the SPR 1936 with attracting instructions. As explained in The Guide, it 
was seen as imperative that solicitors’ advice was not tainted by arrangements for obtaining 
work.
150
 As regards a rationale for selection, it appeared that the principles addressed a range 
of key audiences; clients (c and e), third parties (a), the state (f) and profession (d). For 
evidence that such lists are also strategic it is only necessary to note that, just a year after the 
Law Society’s first effort, SPR 1988 appeared with a new sixth principle, (f) the solicitor's 
duty to the Court. This was undoubtedly added in anticipation of the acquisition of powers to 
grant higher rights of audience.  
  
The appearance of integrity and independence on the same line illustrates the proposition that 
the interpretation of such standards is not always obvious. Items in lists can be discontinuous, 
with each unit maintaining its individuality as a particular instance, and accretive, with each 
unit contributing to collective meaning.
151
  With any list, unanticipated dynamics develop 
when apparent ‘strangers’, such as integrity and independence, are held together. Without an 
appreciation of context the reason for the juxtaposition is unclear. One possible interpretation 
is that integrity refers to honesty, or a standard slightly less demanding than honesty, a 
reading supported by the fact that solicitors are often charged with lack of integrity in 
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disciplinary proceedings.
152
 Another is that integrity is distinct from honesty and refers to 
‘wholeness’; conformity with the ethics of role. This reading is also consistent with the 
approach in recent professional disciplinary cases.
153
 It is also consistent with usage in other 
professions, where lacking integrity may be linked with an integral feature of particular 
occupations. Accountants, for example, may lack integrity if they do not display 
objectivity.
154
 A context that may link principle (a) with (b) is that SPR 1990 was produced in 
the shadow of government threats to eliminate restrictive trade practices in the professions.
155
  
The Law Society’s intention was to screen the rules while doing what was possible to protect 
‘independence’ from multi-disciplinary and multi-national partnerships, competition, 
referrals and cross-selling, for example, of conveyancing and estate agency services.
156
 The 
Law Society’s pressing concern was the threat to solicitors’ practices from pressures to limit 
their freedom of action.
157
 Therefore, one of only two pieces of guidance provided on the 
principles suggested that solicitors would infringe them if they agreed never to act against an 
opposing party again as a term of a settlement.
158
  
 
The principles in SPR 1990 were to be reviewed by the Law Society’s Regulation Review 
Working Group, which was then engaged in the process which led to SCC 2007. In 2000 the 
chairman promised that the proposed code would ‘include values which distinguish the 
solicitors' profession from others’, replacing the six principles in Practice Rule 1 with ‘ten 
commandments’159:  
 
1. Acting with integrity 
2. Maintaining independence 
3. Making the client’s interests paramount subject to duties to justice and professional 
conduct 
4. Maintaining confidentiality 
5. Avoiding conflicts of interest  
6. Acting competently 
7. Treating clients fairly 
8. Maintaining client care procedures 
9. Maintaining appropriate business systems 
10. Acting so as to not damage the integrity of the profession 
 
In line with the chairman’s promise that the new code would ‘be realistic rather than 
aspirational’ there were no explicit references to third party or public interests. The list even 
omitted the consumer provision, freedom to instruct a solicitor of choice, and the public 
interest provision, observing the duty to the court. Therefore, despite the proposed list being 
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longer than the previous version, it was also more client-focused. As Levin explained, ‘[t]he 
vision does not mention duties to society (too wide and uncertain) and neither does it mention 
duties to uphold the reputation of the profession (too self-regarding)’.160 
 
In 2003, while the Law Society was consulting on the new code, the chair of the working group 
wrote an article claiming an effort ‘to link the core duties into the more detailed rules so that 
there is cohesion between [the] different layers’.161 A later article suggested that the Law Society 
Council had approved the code but that the Department of Constitutional Affairs had ‘required 
some amendments to be made to the original draft’.162 These changes were not specified but the 
article then referred to six core principles. These were:  
 
1.01 You must uphold the rule of law and the proper administration of justice. 
1.02 You must act with integrity. 
1.03 You must not allow your independence to be compromised. 
1.04 You must act in the best interests of each client. 
1.05 You must provide a good standard of service to your clients. 
1.06 You must not behave in a way that is likely to diminish the trust the public 
places in you or the profession. 
 
As in the working group’s first list, there was no freedom to instruct a solicitor of choice. This, it 
appeared, was because insurers, trade unions and others had fatally undermined the principle. A 
commentary on the omission noted that ‘in exceptional circumstances, where it is in the client's 
best interest and where there is no compromise of a solicitor's independence, it might be 
appropriate for a client to agree with a third party that they will use the services of a particular 
solicitor only’.163 While the principle had disappeared, it was stated that such arrangements 
could still breach core duties 1.03 and 1.04. The more detailed code of conduct also provided 
that solicitors could not make arrangements that would fetter their freedom to make 
recommendations.
164
 The duty of confidentiality had been removed from the list proposed by the 
working group, while the duty to the court was restored, albeit more broadly expressed, in the 
second part of the first principle. 
 
The working party proposal to separate principles relating to integrity and independence 
survived. Integrity was said to refer to duties towards clients, the courts, lawyers and 
others,
165
 including not knowingly giving false or misleading information and honouring 
professional undertakings. Independence meant avoiding ‘pressure from clients, the courts, or 
any other source’.166 This suggested that the original conjoining of the now separated items 
was no accident; solicitors’ integrity was the goal and maintaining formal independence was 
the means to that end. The decision to separate independence and integrity afforded flexibility 
to argue, for example, that employed solicitor advocates would be sufficiently independent to 
prioritise the duty to the court.
167
 In addition to the substantive changes to the list, there were 
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also changes in the expression of the principles. The working party’s original item, making 
‘the client’s interests paramount’, had changed back to the Practice Rule 1 wording, ‘acting in 
clients’ best interests’.  
 
The meeting papers of five Law Society committees over the relevant period revealed no 
reason for the reduction in the working group’s list or the changes of emphasis.168 The 
possibility that the new list was influenced by the Department of Constitutional Affairs is 
enhanced by the adoption, unheralded, of Principle 1.01. Neither profession had previously 
mentioned the rule of law in their codes or regulations, but it was a proposed regulatory 
objective of the LSA. It was not obvious why ‘upholding the rule of law’ appeared in the 
same principle as acting with independence in the interests of justice. Did the authors see 
these concepts as similar, or as what they seem to be, contrasting and balancing norms? If 
they were seen to be in conflict, there was no explanation of how they related. Guidance, first 
appearing in the The Guide but included with subsequent editions of the principles, suggested 
that conflicts between principles should be ‘decided by the public interest and especially the 
interests of the administration of justice’.169 This presumably applied to potential conflicts 
within a principle. If so, in the event of conflict, the proper administration of justice trumped 
the rule of law. 
 
Just prior to the publication of the SCC 2007  the Chair of the SRA Board claimed that  ‘[i]n 
about 70 words, rule 1 sets out what should be at the heart of what it means to be a solicitor. 
These core duties are the overarching framework within which the other 25 rules can be 
understood.’170 Given that the changes appear to have occurred following submission of the 
draft code, it seems unlikely that any detailed mapping of principles and rules that had taken 
place would have survived. Nevertheless, and despite the lack of transparency regarding the 
process by which the principles for SCC 2007 were agreed, the SRA CC 2011 adopted the 
same first six principles. Moreover, four additional principles merely covered cooperation 
with regulators and conduct of business issues.  
 
The Bar did not include a separate list of principles with its codes of conduct until the 
publication of BSB CC 2014. The introduction to BCC 1981 did, however, explain that the 
rules and standards were intended to ensure that self-employed barristers were ‘… completely 
independent in conduct and in professional standing as sole practitioners… to act only as 
consultants instructed by solicitors and other approved persons … and to acknowledge a 
public obligation based on the paramount need for access to justice to act for any client in 
cases within their field of practice.
171
 The code thereby identified role independence, ethical 
independence and neutrality in client selection as its three main values. In consulting on the 
proposed code for barristers in 2011 the BSB proposed eight core duties. These are set out in 
the second column of Table 1, together with two later additions; cooperation with regulators 
(CD9) and practice management duties (CD10).  
 
Comparison of the core principles and duties of the professions in Table 1 reveals that the 
standards outlined are almost identical, with items relating to protecting client money (SRA) 
and confidentiality (BSB) representing the only substantive differences. This convergence 
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may be explained by emulation. Evidence of the operation of this process is most clearly 
observed in the transition of duties to the profession, from issues of reputation in the earlier 
codes to issues of trust in later versions. The BCC 1981 included a provision proscribing 
conduct ‘… likely to diminish public confidence in the legal profession or … which 
otherwise bring the legal profession into disrepute’172 while the SPC 1990 provided that 
solicitors were not to do anything that compromised ‘the good repute… of the solicitors’ 
profession’.173 The SCC 2007 abandoned focus on the profession’s reputation in favour of 
‘the trust the public places in you and the profession’,174 and both the SRA (Principle 7) and 
BSB (CD 5) continued in this vein. It seems reasonable to conclude that regulators refer to 
the principles of comparable occupations when compiling their own.  
 
Table 1: Comparing the core principles and duties of the legal profession’s new codes of 
conduct 
SRA Principles
175
 BSB Core Duties
176
 
1. uphold the rule of law and the proper 
administration of justice; 
2. act with integrity; 
3. not allow your independence to be 
compromised; 
4. act in the best interests of each client; 
5. provide a proper standard of service to 
your clients; 
6. behave in a way that maintains the trust 
the public places in you and in the 
provision of legal services; 
7. comply with your legal and regulatory 
obligations and deal with your regulators 
and ombudsmen in an open, timely and 
co-operative manner; 
8. run your business or carry out your role in 
the business effectively and in accordance 
with proper governance and sound 
financial and risk management principles; 
9. run your business or carry out your role in 
the business in a way that encourages 
equality of opportunity and respect for 
diversity; and 
10. protect client money and assets. 
CD1. You must observe your duty to the 
court in the administration of justice. 
CD2. You must act in the best interests of 
each client. 
CD3. You must act with honesty and 
integrity. 
CD4. You must maintain your independence. 
CD5. You must not behave in a way which is 
likely to diminish the trust and confidence 
which the public places in you or in the 
profession. 
CD6. You must keep the affairs of each 
client confidential. 
CD7. You must provide a competent 
standard of work and service to each client. 
CD8. You must not discriminate unlawfully 
against any person.  
CD9. You must be open and co-operative 
with your regulators. 
CD10. You must take reasonable steps to 
manage your practice, or carry out your role 
within your practice, competently and in such 
a way as to achieve compliance with your 
legal and regulatory obligations. 
 
Apart from the reference to the rule of law in the SRA Handbook, the influence of the public-
facing norms characterising the LSA regulatory objectives was not obvious in the lists. Of the 
professional principles set out in the LSA, the strongest non-client obligation was that 
litigators and advocates complied ‘… with their duty to the court to act with independence in 
                                                 
172
 BCC 1981  para.301.  
173
 SPR 1990 r 1(d). 
174
 SCC 2007 Core Duties r1.6. 
175
 SRA SRA Principles 2011 Version 15. 
(http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/handbook/handbookprinciples/content.page) 23/10/2015. 
176
 BSB Handbook Part:2, The Code of Conduct (2014) B - The Core Duties. 
the interests of justice’,177 a form of words suggesting a wider obligation than simply a duty 
not to mislead the court. The regulators’ lists took a different line on this principle. The BSB 
standard was explicitly framed as ‘your duty to the court’, suggesting a limited obligation not 
to mislead as set out in BSB CC 2014. The equivalent SRA principle, upholding the proper 
administration of justice, was actually broader than both the LSA objective and the BSB 
standard, because it was not framed by reference to the duty to the court. This interpretation 
was supported by importation of the idea, from the SCC 2007, that conflict between 
principles should be resolved in a way that ‘serves the public interest in the particular 
circumstances, especially the public interest in the proper administration of justice’.178 The 
addition of ‘especially’ suggested a potentially broader scope of application than just 
litigation and advocacy. Given that such application was likely to occur in the area of public 
interest disclosures in breach of confidence and LPP, neither of which was supported by the 
codes, the guidance may have been misleading. 
  
As with any list, the legal professions’ lists of standards have a ‘load-limit’; what can be 
represented within the context.
179
 Whereas a list of six was deemed adequate before the LSA, 
both regulators now have 10 standards. In both lists, however, the additional four standards 
tend to relate to practice management issues. Load limits force compilers to consider matters 
such as priorities for inclusion and levels of generality. It is noticeable that both of the current 
lists present a range of norms that are not exclusively client-facing. They move from public-
facing norms, through character, duties to clients to business requirements. This suggests that 
the lists do not just address regulated parties, but are intended to communicate with various 
audiences. The common ground for both regulators is that the persons they approve prioritise 
their duty to the administration of justice and acting with integrity, meaning, as argued earlier 
in this section, behaving consistently with role. Obligations to clients come behind these 
duties. The hypothesis that the standards and the principles address different audiences is 
supported by the fact that the order of the lists may be at odds with the sequence of 
substantive obligations in codes of conduct. The SRA code, for example, sets out the 
responsibilities litigators and advocates owe to the courts much later in the order than client 
responsibilities. While the regulators may claim that the sequences in the lists are random, 
this seems unlikely. The consultation document for the BSB CC 2014 stated that items in the 
draft list were not presented in any order of importance
180
 but the movement of the duty to 
clients from CD6 to CD2, between the consultation and final version, suggests purposive 
ordering.  
 
VI. Conclusion: Presenting and interpreting narratives, standards and values 
 
Analysis of the regulatory handbooks created since the LSA confirms that the legal regulators 
largely re-formulated longstanding professional norms. Despite the underlying consumerist 
and public interest rationale of the Act, the professions’ new codes did not make radical 
changes. The barristers’ rules set out in BCC 2014 continued to focus on an advocacy role, 
based on neutrality and partisanship, the underlying basis of which were similar to that found 
in the ABA Model Rules. The solicitors’ rules contained in SRA 2011 did not support role-
differentiated behaviour in key aspects of the standard conception, but nor did they increase 
substantive commitments to consumers, to increasing client autonomy or to reducing harm to 
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third parties. Indeed, the trend in the solicitors’ rules over time has been toward reducing 
what may be regarded as more ethically-based obligations and increasing bureaucratic 
requirements. As a result of the pattern whereby core rules tend to be reproduced and minor 
rules and guidance omitted, the normative obligations in both sets of  rules seem to be 
hardening around core roles. This process is likely to continue when the SRA seeks to further 
reduce the size of the handbook for solicitors in 2016.
181
 It can be argued that contraction of 
the rules and guidance has a number of implications. Among the most likely is that it is 
indicative of movement towards regulation using only broad principles. This process may 
decrease normative differences between the regulated group and other occupations or place 
increased reliance on cultural understanding of practice norms.      
 
In creating the high-level standards the SRA adopted the principles established in the SPR 
1990, while the BSB appears to have been heavily influenced by the SRA’s list. The strong 
similarity in the high level standards of barristers and solicitors focused attention on the small 
but remarkable differences that did exist. Each profession claimed a value that, according to 
their respective narratives, was the other’s central rationale, but the profession more strongly 
associated with that value did not claim it. Thus, confidentiality appeared in the Bars’ list but 
not the solicitors, while barristers, but not solicitors, claimed honesty. The most striking 
omission was, however, the failure of barristers to match the solicitors’ commitment to 
maintaining the rule of law. The position in the lists of standards therefore contradicted the 
position maintained in the codes of conduct. The BCC 2014 reflected the ideology of 
advocacy and the values of neutrality and partisanship. The solicitors, in contrast, having 
initially adopted the Bar’s advocacy norms as part of the higher rights regime, diluted them in 
SCC 2007 by withdrawing special duties to advocacy consumers and the higher standard for 
partisanship for advocacy clients. As a consequence, barristers and solicitors offer advocacy 
consumers quite different normative commitments.  
 
It cannot truly be said that the BSB list of core values represented a ‘distillation of collective 
experience and reflection’.182 As demonstrated, the Bar’s codes of conduct consistently 
claimed a commitment to defending a particular conception of the rule of law that solicitors 
did not. Yet, the absence of any representation of neutrality or the cab rank rule in the BSB 
core values belied the Bar’s fierce commitment to what it generally treated as an iconic 
institution. When consultants appointed by the legal oversight regulator opined that the rule 
was anachronistic and redundant,
183
 the Bar Council and BSB issued a lengthy 
methodological and philosophical riposte
184
 and legal critique.
185
 A sometimes cynical 
blogging barristers’ clerk said of the cab rank rule ‘[b]arristers really, really believe in it. Not 
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all barristers but the vast majority cling to its virtue and its values’.186 Indicating that the 
values of solicitors and barristers were almost identical invited the conclusion that there was 
no need for separate regulation. By underplaying its unique commitment to legalism the 
regulator did not, in the public relations jargon, present the Bar’s unique selling proposition. 
Inadequate attention to the Bar’s narrative and codes when producing the BSB core values 
may yet prove problematic politically. 
 
The solicitors’ high-level principles can be criticised from a different perspective; they are so 
familiar that they are largely taken for granted. They were, however, relatively unexamined 
from the start. The consultation leading to the SPR 1990 received 489 responses but only six 
comments on the principles.
187
 In the SPR 1990 the principles in the lists and the content of 
the rules were not congruent, a problem addressed by explanatory material in The Guide, but 
not since. When it reviews the SRA handbook in 2016, the SRA promises that it is ‘keen to 
explore whether: we have the right number of principles… whether the current principles 
remain fit for purpose or need to be revised and/or whether any of the current content can, or 
should, be better reflected in our Code of Conduct’.188 It has been argued here that this last 
point is an essential requirement for review. The SRA proposition that ‘… the current 
Principles may now be embedded and understood…’ is unduly optimistic. In fact, lack of 
clarity in relation to the high-level standards potentially impedes the functions of regulation, 
aspiration and education.  
 
In terms of regulation, lists of standards were a central pillar of the new principles-based 
regulatory method which the legal sector, and other important service sectors in the United 
Kingdom, were encouraged to use.
189
 The system treats standards as mandatory and 
enforceable independently of codes of conduct. One of the justifications of this approach is 
that it deprives regulated parties of opportunities for manipulation presented by more detailed 
rules.
190
 In long-standing debates regarding the form of ethics codes, a critical issue is the 
need to strike a balance between simplicity and detail.
191
 Ideally, there should be freedom to 
make ethical decisions in a context where there is clarity about the relevant values. It is 
therefore important that high-level standards are either self-explanatory or adequately 
explained.
192
 Whereas the code of conduct may be the obvious place to provide explanation, 
the trend towards trimming the codes potentially leads to reduced clarity. It also increases 
doubt about the currency of previous norms and removes the facility to organically grow new 
obligations, for example, by initially formulating them as guidance. Some alternative 
explanatory format may therefore need to be created. 
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A prediction that the move to principles based regulation would increase uncertainty among 
solicitors
193
 was borne out by a survey which found that two fifths of 1001 solicitors’ firms 
thought the new regulatory standards were not clear.
194
 The academic literature has also 
reflected uncertainty. Two recent articles argued that the principle that solicitors uphold the 
rule of law could be used to hold commercial lawyers accountable for work which assisted 
corporate clients’ efforts to avoid regulation in other countries195 or for schemes which 
‘…while strictly legal, undermine the spirit of the law’.196 Such interpretations of rule of law 
obligations did not reflect the traditional commitments to legalism. These defend the right of 
citizens, and corporations, to receive confidential legal counsel protected by LPP, even 
regarding possibly illegal activity,
197
 provided their lawyers do not participate in such 
activity.
198
 The apparent scope for debate on this issue illustrates why, if regulators bolt broad 
new principles to existing normative frameworks, they should explain what they mean.  
 
In terms of the aspirational and educational functions of a handbook, it is important to 
consider potential for development, communication, interpretation, education and training 
and evaluation.
199
 There is no evidence that the compilers of the various editions of the SPR 
saw their lists of standards as statements of values, but the compilers of the SCC 2007 
certainly expected that their principles would be read and criticised as such.
200
 Any lack of 
clarity and incongruence between narratives, codes of conduct and values are a potential 
barrier to effective education. The final report of the Legal Education and Training Review, 
which was intended to help redefine education in the legal services market, recommended 
that ‘all authorised persons receiving some education in legal values and regulators are 
encouraged to consider developing a broad approach to this subject rather than a limited 
focus on conduct rules or principles’.201 If the values referred to are those reflected in the 
handbooks, designing an authoritative curriculum around them could be problematic. When 
legal professions refer to supporting the rule of law, are they referring to the standard 
conception of the lawyer’s role or do they mean something more general, such as acting in 
the public interest? The answer is important. In a context where professions generally are 
marginalised, effectively communicating distinctive legal values to students, practitioners, the 
public and governments could play an important role in preserving a degree of autonomy for 
lawyers as groups with a fundamentally important social role. From that point of view, 
representations of narratives, standards and values must present a consistent, clear and 
grounded vision. 
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